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Introduction1 
There are a large number of studies that focus upon the question of how different states 
adjust and respond to the challenges that the process popularly known as ‘globalisation’ 
poses.2 An important case of adjustment processes, not least as it has received wide 
attention in the more general public debate, is the internationalisation (or deregulation) of 
the formerly nationally organised credit markets. Governments performed this process of 
deregulation all over the industrialised world during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. It is 
important to recognise that the formal and definitive decision to deregulate was preceded 
by a process of international capital market growth. Hence, an international economic 
infrastructure was created in a truly ad-hoc fashion in the post war era; important 
elements in this new landscape were institutions such as the Eurodollar-market and the 
multinational corporations. For certain actors, this created international alternatives to 
previously exclusive national institutions. 
In this way international institutional arrangements emerged which could interfere 
with the national institutions in different ways. In a simple timing sequence, the new 
international institutions were first seen as troublesome competitors, which could be 
restrained in different ways. In the next phase they were seen as supplements to the 
national credit market. In the last phase international institutions generally superseded the 
national solution. Understood in this way, the processes of capital market deregulation 
that took place in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s all over the industrialised world, illustrate 
in an ideal way the theoretical understanding of institutional change. 
In a comparison between the OECD-countries, the differences in timing and 
sequence between countries are quite large, creating different patterns of regulation. 
                                                 
1 U Strandberg’s participation in the writing of the present paper is based on the research project 
‘The Shift in Economic-Political Doctrine. The Case of Sweden in a Comparative Perspective’ 
(registration number 1997-5110:01, 02, 03), that has been sponsored by The Bank of Sweden 
Tercentenary Foundation. 
2 Among the literature that focus upon the adjustment argument one find J. Moses. ‘Abdication 
from National Policy Autonomy. What’s Left to Leave?’, Politics and Society, Vol. 22, No. 2 
(1994). J. Pontusson ‘At the End of the Third Road Swedish Social Democracy in Crisis’, Politics 
and Society, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1992). R. Keohane, H. Milner, ‘Internationalization of Domestic 
Politics’, in: R. Keohane and H. Milner (Eds.), Internationalization and Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996). G.Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998). E. Helleiner, ‘Explaining the Globalisation of Financial 
Markets - Bringing States Back In’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 2, No. 
(1995). E. Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State 
(Harvard University Press, 1994). 
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Thus, there is a large variance in national economic political response to the increased 
supply of, and competition for, international capital.3 
In a comparison with the rest of the OECD, Sweden was a latecomer to 
deregulation. What characterises the Swedish case is also that the Social Democratic 
governments deregulated with large pains and under great hesitance. Given the traditional 
view of Swedish industry – that it was internationally oriented and comparably open to 
innovative processes – this might seem paradoxical. This openness ought to have made 
the country more open to the benefits that the international capital market offered, but it 
did not. Using a historic perspective, the aim of this paper is to try to explore the 
institutional and political driving forces for the surprisingly hesitant process of 
deregulation.4 
It should be explicitly noted that the aim of the paper is not to bring about either an 
actor-centred or a downright economic explanation to the hesitant and late Swedish 
foreign exchange deregulation.5 To produce perfect explanations down to the last detail 
regarding policy change certainly necessitates focusing in detail on real world actors as 
well as on economic figures. To pose hypothesis for such a perfect explanation one must 
first explore how the domestic political and economic structure was constituted 
historically and institutionally, that is one must understand the significance of the 
structures in which the battle of the players (actors) as well as the impact of the economic 
figures was effective.6 
                                                 
3 As for the different patterns of deregulation see OECD, Exchange Control Policy, (1993). See 
also J. Goodman, L. Pauly, ‘The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an 
Age of Global Markets’, World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1993), pp. 50-82. 
4 As for a general theoretical explication and discussion of institutional theory as an approach that 
seeks to analyse the pervasive effects of earlier policy choices on current policy processes and 
choices, see for example the following studies. S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, F. Longstreth, Structuring 
politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
T. Scocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United 
States (Cambridge University Press, 1992). L. Alston, T. Eggertsson, D. North, Empirical Studies 
in Institutional Change (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
5 In her doctoral thesis, the economic historian C. Telasuo concludes that the Swedish foreign 
exchange deregulation should be seen as an economic structurally bounded adjustment process in 
which the leading political actors’ main incentive was to render the Swedish economy competi-
tiveness. When discussing the slow process of deregulation in terms of path dependency as well as 
a case, in which the governments awaited balance of payments, Telasuo certainly touches the 
questions of timing and sequence. However, since it lies beyond the focus of her analysis, it 
certainly remains to explore why the Swedish currency deregulation was relatively late and 
hesitant. C. Telasuo, Småstater under internationalisering. Valutamarknadens avreglering i 
Sverige och Finland på 1980-talet. En studie i institutionell omvandling (Kompendiet, 2000). 
6 Confer with Goodman and Pauly, ‘The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Manage-
ment in an Age of Global Markets’, p. 80. 
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This paper is outlined in the following way. In the first part, the hesitancy of Social 
Democratic governments in relation to other political parties is described. This is 
followed by a section where the Government White Papers of the period 1968-1982, 
analysing how the capital market regulation affected the functioning of the Swedish 
economy, is explored. The conclusion from this exploration tells us that the negative 
economic effects of maintained regulation were common knowledge already in the early 
1970s, at least among the group of people engaged in producing Government White 
Papers. All in all, the White Papers draw a picture of increased economic costs as a result 
of institutional austerity. 
The second part of the paper consists of an overview of what might be labelled the 
political economy of Swedish capital market regulation, starting out from the origin of the 
regulation in 1932 and ending up in the 1970s. The analysis is focused upon how the 
Swedish capital market regulation was a direct effect of the self-sufficient conditions of 
the 1930s and 40s, and how it was, somewhat paradoxically, strengthened in the more 
open economic conditions of the 1950s and 1960s. At the same time, the international 
capital market and the Swedish multinational corporations expanded greatly. Thus it is 
further analysed how this development forced the political decision-makers to confront 
the question of trying to allocate between national or international sources of capital 
supplies. 
In the last section, the paper will be brought to an end with some concluding 
remarks and contributions to the question regarding change of historically embedded in-
stitutional arrangements. 
The debate revisited: Swedish political and official views with 
regard to the capital market, 1970-85 
In the increasingly intense debate in the Swedish parliament during the early and mid 
1980s, the non-Socialist parties demanded that the foreign exchange regulation should be 
abandoned entirely and immediately. According to those parties, the development and 
growth of the Swedish economy was dependent upon its ability to take part in a suppo-
sedly advantageous international trend towards financial deregulation. According to these 
arguments, only an immediate and thorough deregulation would give Swedish companies 
access to the same financial possibilities as competing companies’ abroad. To this, the 
CEFOS Working Paper 5 A Drawn-Out Retreat from Corporatism 
Strandberg & Jörnmark 
– 4 – 
Social Democratic governments argued that the time had not yet arrived for an entire 
deregulation to be possible.7 
Besides referring to waiting for the ‘right’ moment with regard to the balance of 
payments, one of the central arguments repeatedly put forth by the Social Democratic 
governments was based upon a distinction between productive and speculative economic 
activities. In practice, this argument stated that as long as current payments and direct 
investments in manufacturing and producing enterprising were not restrained by the 
remaining foreign exchange regulation, the productive economic activities would not be 
harmed. Hence those parts of the regulation that restrained short-term speculative 
transactions could stay in place without harming productive economic activities. Thus, 
the Social Democratic governments in the early and mid 1980s clearly depicted short-
term transactions as a fundamentally undesired and dispensable kind of economic 
activity.8 
When the Social Democratic government carried out the final and formal dere-
gulation in 1989-90, the decision was criticised from the left. When responding to this 
critique and defending the rational for a complete deregulation, the Social Democrats 
painted a very different picture with regard to the regulations’ significance and impact on 
Swedish economy: ‘Free trade is facilitated by free flows of capital. The foreign exchan-
ge regulation restrained the competitiveness of Swedish companies as well as affected the 
companies differently, mainly depending on, among other things, size, international 
exposure and their direction of production’.9 
From a short term and party political point of view, the decision made by the Social 
Democratic government in 1989-90 represents a true turn-around. As this paper focuses 
on the institutional and economic-structural factors behind the change of the Swedish 
structure for allocations of credits, it leaves this political turn-around open.10 Instead the 
paper discusses the historical context that necessitated these changes. 
                                                 
7 For the dividing line among the parties see, SOU 1985:52, Översyn av valutaregleringen: slutbe-
tänkande från Valutakommittén, p. 512, pp. 276-278. 
8 Finansutskottets betänkande 1982/83:41 om fortsatt valutareglering (prop 1982/83:121), p.3; 
Finansutskottets betänkande 1986/87:27 om fortsatt valutareglering, m.m. (prop. 1986/87:123), p. 
12. 
9 Finansutskottets betänkande 1989/90:20. Riktlinjer för den ekonomiska politiken och för budget-
regleringen m.m. (prop 1989/90:114 och 1989/90:100 bil. 1 och 2), p. 66, Authors translation. 
10 See for example J. Lindvall, The Politics of Purpose. Swedish macroeconomic policy after the 
golden age (Department of Political Science/Gothenburg University, 2004) (doctoral thesis). 
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The following overview takes its point of departure in several official reports 
(Government White Papers)11 which were released during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. 
All of these clearly indicated that the Swedish economy was becoming increasingly 
integrated with the international economy.12 Thus, at least among the group of people 
engaged in producing Government White Papers, the negative economic effects of 
maintained regulation were common knowledge already in the early 1970s.13 
The foreign exchange regulations were described as having several kinds of 
constraining effects on Swedish economy. First, the regulation severely restricted 
foreigners to buy and sell Swedish bonds and shares in Sweden. The regulation 
determined how extensive the actual movements of capital could be and affected the 
foreign investors’ trust in Swedish stocks and bonds. In the 1970s, the various Swedish 
governments alleged, as a reason to restrict border-crossing transactions in stocks and 
bonds, that such transactions could put severe pressures on the exchange reserve, 
pressures that could appear at the most inconvenient time from the point of view of the 
Swedish economy. To be precise, if foreign investors wanted clearance of their 
investments, the regulation rendered it possible for the Swedish Central Bank to deny 
repurchasing of stocks and bonds. 
Consequently the regulation had a restraining effect both on trading with foreign 
countries and, above all, on foreign investors’ interest in investing in Swedish stocks and 
bonds. Moreover, this was happening during a time period when the Swedish domestic 
saving rate was insufficient, thus leading to a deficit in the balance of payments. Swedish 
companies therefore were in need of open channels to the international capital markets. 
Because of the foreign exchange regulation, Swedish businesses could not attract 
seriously needed foreign credits and venture capital.14 
Not only was the foreign exchange regulation directly restricting the flow of credits 
and venture capital, but the regulation also restricted the activities and prospects for the 
Swedish banking sector, hence indirectly undermining Swedish companies’ possibilities 
                                                 
11 The official reports are the finished products of the Swedish Government’s own established 
system for commissions of inquiry, all classified as publications in a continuous sequence of so 
called SOU:s’. 
12 See for example SOU 1975:50 Internationella koncerner i industriländer. Samhällsekonomiska 
aspekter: betänkande av Koncentrationsutredningen, p. 8 or SOU 1983:17 Näringspolitiska 
aspekter av internationella investeringar: betänkande av direktinvesteringskommittén, p. 155. 
13 See for example SOU 1975:50, p. 8 or SOU 1983:17, p. 155. 
14 SOU 1978:13 Kapitalmarknaden i svensk ekonomi. Bilaga 2-4: Hushållssparande och skatte-
regler, Aktiemarknaden, Industrins finansiering: betänkande av Kapitalmarknadsutredningen, p. 
13, 91f. 
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for favourable credit conditions. To start with, the foreign exchange regulation prohibited 
Swedish banks from re-financing abroad their commercial credits to domestic borrowers. 
Since those credits were made largely on a short-term basis, extensive borrowing 
transactions could have had a destabilising influence on the foreign balance. If the banks, 
given their close contact with the international capital markets, were expecting a Swedish 
devaluation, it would become likely that they would liquidate their foreign short-term 
credits. In short: the banks would try to profit from regular financial activities. Thus, the 
Governments wanted to restrict the banking sectors’ ability to take part in financial 
activities that could destabilise the currency market.15 
Furthermore, since foreign re-financing of loans to foreign exporters/importers or 
to the latter’s bankers was permitted, the prohibition for re-financing of credits to 
domestic borrowers stood out as rather problematic from the banking sector point of 
view. Since foreign banks were permitted to give direct commercial credits to Swedish 
export and/or import companies, the described inconsistency placed Swedish banks in a 
disadvantageous position. Even though Swedish banks generally acted as intermediaries 
in transactions between foreign banks and Swedish companies, the regulation hindered 
them greatly, especially since many of the larger Swedish multinational corporations 
already had direct contact with foreign banks through their foreign subsidiaries. 
From the point of view of the Swedish banking sector, yet another hindrance 
followed directly from the described inconsistency. It would have been more favourable 
if Swedish banks themselves would be in charge of foreign borrowing transactions, 
profits from rationalisations as well as better terms of credits could be achieved.16 
The regulatory regime did not only restrict the growth and development of the 
banking sector as such, it indirectly also affected the business activities in other sectors. 
The draconian rationing measures that regulated the domestic capital market affected the 
mid-sized and smaller industrial companies in a disproportionate way, as they were 
almost entirely dependent upon the Swedish banking sector for credits. The larger 
multinational corporations, on the other hand, were not affected to the same extent, since 
they had access to the international credit market.17 
                                                 
15 SOU 1978:11 Kapitalmarknaden i svensk ekonomi. Huvudbetänkande av Kapitalmarknadsut-
redningen, p. 598. 
16 SOU 1978:11, p. 598. 
17 SOU 1978:12 Kapitalmarknaden i svensk ekonomi. Bilaga 1: Kapitalmarknader utomlands: 
betänkande av kapitalmarknadskommittén, p. 164f. See also SOU 1982:53 Kreditpolitiken: fakta, 
teorier och erfarenheter: expertrapporter från Kreditpolitiska utredningen, see especially p. 200 
for a discussion on externalities from maintained regulation. 
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Access to the capital market in the 1970s: The coming of the 
multinationals and the emergence of asymmetries 
As stated earlier the effects of the new Multinational corporations were observed in the 
Government White Papers already during the early 1970s. Thus, the ‘Concentration 
Commission inquiry’ (Koncentrationsutredningen) put in a great effort, in order to 
analyse what impact the steadily growing share of multinational corporations had on the 
national economy. In a general description in one of its reports, the commission depicts 
the role and function of Multinational corporations in the following way: multinational 
corporations are specialised international systems of information. Due to their increased 
breadth, they could be expected to speed up different impulses that are spreading through 
the world economy. In turn, this would increase the demands on different national 
stabilisation policies.18 
The clearest distinction between multinational corporations and other companies is 
that the former carries through transactions that are internal for the corporation but 
external to the states.19 It was thus possible for multinational corporations to get around 
the foreign exchange regulation and transfer capital within the corporation, and across the 
national borders.20 This is not to say that all sorts of capital transactions within the 
corporations escaped the foreign exchange regulation. As was the case with the truly 
domestic companies, regular credits between the subsidiary companies within the 
corporation were allowed subject to permission from the Central Bank. On the other 
hand, it was from the increasing volume of current payments that the possibility emerged 
for short-term capital transactions within the multinational corporations. Current 
payments within a corporation are in practice solely executed as open accounts in 
combination with relatively long periods of credits. This created great opportunities for 
the multinational corporations to make substantial relocation of payments; thus profiting 
from different arbitrage operations.21 
                                                 
18 For an analysis of the advantageous conditions, inherent in the organisation of a multinational 
corporation, for producing surplus value on short-term transactions see: SOU 1975:50, p. 127, p. 
240. Furthermore, for an account of the Swedish multinational corporations, their growth and 
share of the Swedish business structure, see: SOU 1975:50, pp. 85-93, especially Table 4.1 and 
4.2, p. 87. See also SOU 1968:3 Industrins struktur och konkurrensförhållanden: betänkande från 
Koncentrationsutredningen, p. 18, pp. 236-251. 
19 SOU 1975:50, p. 33. 
20 SOU 1975:50, p. 239, 248. 
21 Such as devaluation’s, revaluation’s and interest level differences. See SOU 1975:50, pp. 248-
49. 
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Given this background, we draw three conclusions. First, the foreign exchange 
regulation did not affect all Swedish enterprises in the same way. Fundamentally the 
regulation had an asymmetric effect on Swedish enterprises, granting big business sub-
stantial advantages over small and medium-sized business, the commercial banking 
sector included. Secondly, and directly following from this first conclusion, the multi-
national corporations had much greater opportunities than the more domestic and smaller 
companies to cost-efficiently finance their investments through direct import of capital.22 
Thirdly, the mere existence of the Multinational corporations allowed scope for a greater 
volume of short-term capital transactions.23 
Moreover, as is formulated in the following quotation from the Concentration 
Commission, this situation had certainly a bearing not only on the prospect for short-term 
transactions of capital, but also on the amount actually affected by such capital 
transactions, hence affecting the national economy. ‘In the Swedish foreign exchange 
regulation, also short-term movements of capital are subject to authorisation. Despite this, 
such transactions take place to a large extent through relocation of terms of payments, 
which manifests itself by considerable unexplained variations in exchange reserves. It is 
this kind of capital movement, which the Multinational corporations have much greater 
opportunities conduct, which also could be a problem for the balance of the national 
economy and for the efficiency of monetary policies’.24 
From this follows four other conclusions. First, the total amount of short-term 
capital movements could be expected to further increase as the total share of multi-
national corporations increased. Secondly, since multinational corporations have both 
legally and in practice greater opportunities to make profits from short-term transactions, 
it is difficult for governments to prevent or restrict such a development. Third, the 
continuation of restrictions on short-term transactions would continue to increase the 
asymmetries between small/middle-sized and big business, with regard to their supply of 
capital. Fourth, since the Swedish big industry was not really hindered by the foreign 
exchange regulation, the relatively low profile of its representative organisations seems 
only rational and quite expected.25 
                                                 
22 SOU 1975:50, p. 248-49. 
23 Already in 1975 the amount of transactions within Swedish multinational corporations repre-
sented 29% of the Swedish export and 26% of the Swedish import., SOU 1975:50, p. 251. 
24 Authors translation, SOU 1975:50, p. 251, see also Ibid., p. 25. 
25 Confer with Telasuo, Småstater under internationalisering, pp. 240-41 for an analysis of how in 
the 1980s different interest groups made different claims on the government regarding the 
presence of the foreign exchange regulation. Its worthwhile noticing that the representatives of the 
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To conclude, in the middle of the 1980s the Social Democratic governments still 
wanted to restrict the possibilities for ‘pure’ financial transactions (speculations), even 
though the costs were high. Doubtless this government conviction and policy of 
maintaining the foreign exchange regulation struck hardest at the commercial banking 
sector. Given that structures for the allocation of credits are crucial to the functioning of 
all economic systems, and given that the commercial banking sector represents this 
function, one may ask on what grounds Swedish governments willingly ‘sacrificed’ the 
prospect for growth, efficiency, and competitiveness in that sector as well as in smaller 
and middle-sized Swedish companies. Was there a special institutional disposition of the 
Swedish political economy in regards to its structures for allocation of credits and venture 
capital in the economic system which rendered the economy less dependent upon the 
commercial banking sector? If this was the case, the banking sector’s unsuccessful 
promotion of its interests, and the Swedish governments’ discriminatory attitude towards 
the sector, could be seen as rational. To follow up this hypothesis of the Swedish political 
economy’s supposed institutional uniqueness; the next section is devoted to a historical 
analysis of the actual structures for allocation of credits in the Swedish economic system 
during the 20th century. 
Subordinating the financial sector: The making of big business 
and the Corporatist state 
The crisis of the 1920s changed the character of the Swedish banking sector in a profound 
way. The limitations in the ownership of industrial shares that were placed on the banks 
by the crisis measures that followed in the wake of the traumatic Kreuger crash, and the 
concomitant new banking law of 1934, implied that their ability to finance new 
enterprises was greatly reduced.26 With the advent of the new Banking Law, the banks 
had to be content with a more limited role in the Swedish political economy. Faced with 
                                                                                                                                     
commercial banks puts much more efforts than the representatives of industry when claiming a 
thorough and formal deregulation of the foreign exchange market. An analysis of the claims for 
deregulation made by smaller and middle-sized companies, other than the banks, remains to be 
carried out. 
26 The banking law of 1911 had intended to turn the banks into financiers of new industrial 
enterprises, by allowing them to hold industrial stock directly and through the financing of special 
stock issuing institutes. It was these institutes and industrial enterprises that collapsed during the 
financial downturns of 1920-21 and 1929-33. As their creditors, the banks became the owners of 
these entities during these periods. The story is covered by, amongst several others, M. Larsson, 
Staten och kapitalet (Stockholm 1998), Ch. 3 and U. Olsson, I utvecklingens centrum 
(Almkvist&Wicksell 1997), Ch. 3. L-E. Thunholm ‘Affärsbankerna och den industriella 
utvecklingen’ in Skandinaviska Enskilda Bankens Kvartalstidskrift 1/1981 is very interesting in 
relation to this problem, as well. 
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this, the strategy chosen by the banks was to concentrate their energy and resources on a 
kind of “investment trusts”, which only to a certain extent could be governed by the bank. 
These trusts were especially used to hive off the banks problematic credits from the 
preceding Kreuger era. 
Concerning the company sector, the role of the banks changed drastically, not only 
because of the Law of 1934, but also because of an industrial growth strategy implement-
ted by the Social Democratic Minister of Finance, Ernst Wigforss. The essential element 
of this strategy was the Depreciation Law of 1938 that created highly generous deprecia-
tion allowances. In combination with substantially increased tax rates for distributed 
profits, the policy made industrial self-financing much more attractive. 
The implications of these policies are important to understand in order to 
conceptualise the significance of ‘deregulation’. What was created in the late 1930s was 
an alternative structural solution with regard to the allocation of credits and, ultimately, to 
industrial change. In the structure that existed before 1933 the relationship between 
commercial banks and corporations was characterised by interdependence, as banks 
financed firms through credit creation.27 It was this role for the commercial banking 
sector that now grew less significant in the late 1030’s, and had to be substituted by some 
other kind of structural solution for allocation of credits. 
The structural solution of 1938 was to internalise credit flows within companies. 
Consequently the industrial companies, rather than the banks, became the acting subjects 
within the system for credit allocation. What remained for the banks was a limited role as 
intermediary subjects, acting on the behalf of the state and the industrial companies.28 
Structurally, the leading industrial companies thus became much more of independent 
actors in the system for allocation of credit. 
The described structural change of the Swedish system for allocation of credits can 
be viewed as the basis for the ‘Swedish model’, if we are to understand this model as a 
more or less coherent set of national structural solutions defining the political economy. 
The goal of these structural solutions was to produce economic growth, which then was 
to be distributed nationally. Moreover, it was a model that facilitated the state’s capacity 
to manage the economy. In the heyday of Keynesisan economic theory and macroeco-
                                                 
27 On the importance of banks and credit creation, see J. Schumpeter, Theory of economic develop-
ment (Oxford University Press, 1961) 
28 Consequently, it is questionable if the banking sector could be seen as a ‘productive’ business 
sector in itself anymore. 
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nomic management as well as an emerging corporatist structure for political influence, 
such a model for allocation of credits certainly did have a crucial role. 
The corporatist model was first challenged during the late 1940s, as the Swedish 
economy re-entered the growing international economy. After more than half a decade in 
relative self-sufficiency, even the very limited opening towards the surrounding world 
that was carried out between 1945-47 led to profound tensions within the system. The 
split that emerged between industry and the Social Democratic governments in the great 
post war debate over whether or not the state should have a planned economy was the 
most visible result of these tensions.29 Since the regulations of the 1930s had made 
industrial companies the most important subjects within the Swedish economy, it was 
certainly not the banks that were in the forefront of this debate of the late 1940s. 
The depreciation rules, the credit squeeze, national autarky, and its concomitant 
breeding ground for the creation of cartels, all contributed to a basis for large vertically 
integrated national industrial groups. The great market power of these groups made 
extensive internal cash flows possible. The dependency on outside financing decreased as 
a direct result of this.30 Thus, in themselves, the industrial groups brought together both 
the role of the producer and the role of the financier. Consequently this industrial 
supremacy rendered the Swedish capitalist system increasingly autonomous from the 
traditional financial sector. 
It was primarily the growing industrial groups with relatively large interests in 
export markets that benefited by the partial liberalisation that got underway between the 
late 1940s and the rest of the 1950s. The liberalisation was a direct result of the earlier 
tensions but reflected also the emerging American-led multilateral international trading 
system. To become a part of the international trading system, it was almost an imperative 
to open up the national economy in order to allocate resources more effectively.31 
                                                 
29 On the problems of the late 40s, see E. Lundberg, Konjunkturer och ekonomisk politik (SNS, 
1953), J. Jörnmark, Innovationer och industriell omvandling (EHF, 1998), Ch. 3; J. Glete, ASEA 
under 100 år, (ASEA, 1983), pp. 123-126, and A. Söderpalm, Direktörsklubben (Raben och 
Sjögren, 1976). For a political science analysis of the debate, see L. Lewin, Planhushållningsde-
batten (Almqvist & Wiksell, 1967). 
30 The connection between industrial self financing and the credit market is covered by, for 
example U. Olsson, Bank, familj och företagande, (SEB, 1987), Ch. 2, esp. p 78-93 and T. 
Browaldh, ‘Nyemissioner och bankkrediter’ in S. Algott (Ed.) Stockholms fondbörs 100 år 
(Rabén, 1963), pp. 264-76. The strength of individual industrial groups is covered by many 
authors, see for example G. Bondesson Aritmos (Esselte Wezäta, 1988) and Glete, ASEA under 
100 år. 
31 Jörnmark Innovationer och industriell omvandling, Glete, ASEA under 100 år, U. af Trolle 
‘Från monopol till fri konkurrens’ in Om tobak i Sverige (STAB, 1965) 
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Liberalisation during the 1950s consisted, most importantly, of the breaking of 
cartels, the abolishing of price controls, and the deregulation of several markets. 
However, it is very important to note, that these changes did not effect the regulation of 
the credit market. Quite to the contrary, credit regulations were strengthened in 1951-52, 
as lending controls and liquidity ratios were introduced.32 The main reason for these 
increased controls was that large sectors of the economy continued to be regulated. The 
banking sector had to be regulated in order to finance these sectors. Most important in 
this regard was the building sector, along with the public welfare service sector which 
was being prioritised by the governments. 
The problems that the regulations created were well understood at the time: a 
prosperous economy created an increased demand for credits. If credit expansion started, 
interest rates increased along with inflationary pressures. These pressures threatened, 
directly, the politically prioritised sectors, something that could not be passively tolerated. 
One distinct potential problem was that industrial financing could face a threatening 
shortage. During the 1950s, as profits in the industrial sector continued at very high 
levels, however, this potential threat remained largely under control.  
Overall, it was the explicit goal among all the interested parties involved to dis-
mantle the credit regulations. Several official investigations, the trade union (LO), and the 
most influential government officials were of the same opinion by the early 1960s: credit 
market liberalisation was seen as impending, as it was necessary for industrial restruc-
turing.33 
Stuck in traffic: The credit market after 1960 and the limits of 
Corporatism 
Instead of becoming the decade of deregulation, the 1960s became a decade of a 
sharpening credit squeeze, primarily because publicly financed housing programs in-
creased at unprecedented levels. At the same time, competition increased in the world 
                                                 
32 Olsson Bank, familj och företagande, L. Jonung, ‘Riksbankens politik 1945-1990’, In: L. Werin 
(Ed.), Från räntereglering till inflationsnorm, pp. 315-17.  
33 Gunnar Sträng, the then Minister of Finance, in 1961 appointed a committee which was assigned 
the task of doing a thorough and unprejudiced assessment of the foreign exchange regulation. 
Strängs’ directive actually gives the committee permission to analyse the effects of a completely 
deregulated foreign exchange market (Fi:39, 1961 års Riksdagsberättelse, pp. 203-208). LO, 
Samordnad näringspolitik (LO, 1961), Ch. 6, K. Wickman, Kapitalmarknaden och den ekonom-
iska politiken under 1960-talet (Svenska Bankföreningen, 1961) 
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market, and profits in the industrial sector started to level off and decline, thus increasing 
industry’s need for “external” credits.34 
Thus, the economic development of the late 1960s implied that the established 
structural solution for allocation of credits reached a critical point. Since the structural 
solution all since the 1930s was that industry developed its own supply of capital, de-
creasing profits and growing needs for investments undermined this established system 
for allocation of credits.  
A new structural solution, where outside credit facilities were coupled to the 
industry, was urgently called for. A workable strategy would have implied a reconnection 
between the financial sector and the industrial sector. In turn this would have necessitated 
a liberalisation of the financial sector, rendering it possible for that sector to grow and 
become competitive. Partly because of problems in the building sector, this was deemed 
impossible from the government’s points of view. Instead, the government resorted to ad 
hoc measures. 
Thus, by the mid 1960s the allocation of credits between industry and housing had 
become the prime headache for the country’s Minister of Finance, Gunnar Sträng.35 As 
the situation became more and more tense, credit regulations became increasingly detail-
ed. The commercial banking sector was, by this point in time ruled by Sträng’s right hand 
man, Per Åsbrink, who was CEO of the Bank of Sweden during the period 1956-73.36 
It was the politicians’ unwillingness to liberalise while at the same time trying to 
guarantee economic space for industry, which led to the decision to create several new 
industrial financing institutions around 1967. The new department of Industry, the state 
owned Investment Bank, and the new state owned holding company (Statsföretag), were 
thus intended to function as industrial financiers, in this new government-led search for 
structural solutions to the problem of allocating credits to the industrial sector.37 With 
these institutional innovations, the State itself thus tried to play the role of the financier. 
                                                 
34Glete, ASEA under 100 år; J. Bohlin, Svensk varvsindustri 1920-75 (EHI, 1989); Browaldh, 
‘Nyemissioner och bankkrediter’. 
35 Sträng was Minister of Finance between 1955-76. 
36 Jonung ‘Riksbankens politik 1945-1990’, Ch. 14; J. Wallander, Från Vängåvan till 
Kungsträdgården (Stockholm, 1991), pp. 124-26. 
37 See, for example, K. Wickman, Statligt företagande i Sverige (box 4) Staten och näringspolitik-
en; Planhushållningsdebatt igen; Staten och den industriella utvecklingen (box 2); L Éxperience 
Suedoise (box 3). All this material is available in Krister Wickman’s personal archive, which is 
deposited at the archive ARAB in Stockholm. The numbers refers to different boxes. Many of the 
articles were as well published in different papers and journals. Quite significantly, ‘L Éxperience 
Suedoise’ was published in Le Monde Diplomatique in February 1968. Wickman was 
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By the late 1960s, the constraints of the commercial banks had increased to the 
point where the most business oriented Swedish bank, the Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 
had to merge with Skandinaviska Banken. Although this merger was perceived at the 
time (and has often been perceived afterwards, as well) as a demonstration of the strength 
of ‘Swedish Monopoly Capitalism’, the real situation was quite the reverse. It was the 
increased limitations that the regulatory system put upon the actions of the bank that 
forced the Wallenberg family to give up the independence of the Stockholms Enskilda 
Bank.38 
One might see two different roads opening up, with regard to credit market 
solutions during the 1960s. The liberalisations of the 1980s might, in this view, be seen as 
the merging of these two roads into a motorway. First of all an international capital 
market – the Eurodollar market – had been created by the late 1950s. A decade later, it 
was expanding rapidly. In effect, the market had been created by the expansion of world 
trade, as the dollar shortage vanished and turned into a glut. The reason why investors 
and companies preferred to keep their money in the international Eurodollar market was 
the national regulations that existed all over the Western world up till around 1980. 
Indeed, one could understand the developing international credit market as the mirror 
image to (or infrastructure of) increased world trade. Multilateral markets and 
multinational credit markets, and multinational corporations could thus be understood as 
expressions of the same general development. The appearance and the effects from this 
development, which are crucial to the argument in this paper, were increasingly manifest 
in the Swedish economy already in the early 1970s.39 
The Eurodollar market was both a cherished prize and a deadly threat. It was 
destabilising in the way that it undermined the possibilities to defend overvalued curren-
cies, but it was a prize to be won in the enormous business possibilities it opened up in 
offshore banking sectors. By 1970, offshore sectors existed in several European-banking 
centres. It was these international markets that Swedish industry as well as the Swedish 
banking sector was confronted with during the 1970s. 
The first serious failure of the attempts to regulate national and international capital 
markets had come in 1971, when Bretton Woods collapsed. In this collapse, the existence 
                                                                                                                                     
Undersecretary (Statssekreterare) at the Ministry of Finance 1961-67, Minister of Industry 1967-
71 and CEO at the Bank of Sweden 1971-76. 
38 Olsson, Bank, familj och företagande, Ch. 7; U. Olsson, Furthering a fortune: Marcus 
Wallenberg: Swedish banker and industrialis 1899-1982 (Stockholm:Ekerlid, 2001), Ch. 8. 
39 H. van der Wee, Prosperity and upheaval (London, 1986), Ch. 11. 
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of the Eurodollar market had been critical. During the rest of the economically turbulent 
1970s, the increasingly liquid Eurodollar market emerged as one of the most potent forces 
in national policies, as well as in international trade. 
In Sweden, a chain of events signalled this increasing dependence on the interna-
tional capital market. In the first sequence there was an increased demand on the national 
capital market where governments avoided raising the price of money (the interest rate) 
as long as possible. In the next sequence, pressures increased with the oil crisis and 
national demands for compensation, and at this point in time the government choose to 
liberalise the access to the international capital market for Swedish private businesses, in 
order shorten the credit queues. 
As it were, the largest Swedish industrial companies, which had been among the 
pioneers in the new multinational trade system, were very much able to make use of the 
international capital market. By 1974, they were excluded from the credit regulations, and 
allowed to make full use of the international credit market.40 
To the Minister of Finance Sträng, it was a question of the bait that the interna-
tional capital market offered: if industry were allowed to enter the market, it was thought 
that recessions could be smoothed out, without risking to overheat the national market. It 
would thus be possible to strike a ‘fair’ balance between the public and private sector in 
the national credit market.41 This effectively implied that the second road, the national, 
could be closed off to as much competing traffic as possible. To finance the public sector, 
which was growing at an extensive rate during the 1970s, thus became the main role of 
the national banking sector. 
In addition to this, a dominant Swedish political discourse of the relationship 
between the national and international capital markets was established. At the same time 
as the national economic structure grew more and more close to the international during 
the rest of the 1970s and into the 1980s, the discourse was built upon an image of the 
ability to choose, not least the ability to choose the ‘productive’ but reject the 
‘speculative’. The problem with this discourse was that the Swedish capital market was 
functioning in an increasingly choked manner.  
                                                 
40 On the effects of this liberalization see, for example H. Lundström, ‘Hur finansiera bytesbalans-
underskottet’; N. Cavalli -Björkman ‘Bankernas roll’; S. Malmström ‘Företagets problem’, all 
published in Ekonomisk Revy, No. 3 (1975); L. Otterbeck ‘Företagens finansiella utlandsbero-
ende’, Ekonomisk revy, No. 5 (1975) and ‘Industrins behov - en enkät’, Ekonomisk Revy No. 6 
(1975). Of particularly great interest is ‘Den svenska utlandsupplåningen – behov, former, konse-
kvenser’, Ekonomisk Revy, No. 10 (1977). 
41 K. Wickman, ‘Bytesbalansen och den ekonomiska politiken’, Ekonomisk Revy, No. 9 (1975). 
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An unintended effect of the politics of credit regulation was that the Swedish 
multinational corporations became even less dependent upon Sweden. To the Swedish 
banks, this was a large threat, as they risked turning into evermore limited and national 
institutions. This was a frightening proposition to the banks, and it seems to have been the 
most important factor in their demands for deregulation after the late 1970s.42 
The international credit market freed up a ‘national room’ for the huge public 
deficits of the 1970s and early 1980s. Problems associated with crowding out effects were 
mitigated when important actors were allowed to use the international capital market to 
an increasing degree after 1974-75. In connection to this, one can percieve the Eurodollar 
market as a safeguard that sheltered Swedish political-economic developments for close 
to a decade. 
However, the costs associated with the regulations of the credit market increased. 
The measures that forced the commercial banks to finance the public deficits became 
increasingly cumbersome, as the banks were used as vaults for state debt.43 As the banks’ 
amount of government bonds grew, their liquidity increased. One result of this was a 
proliferation of new investment companies and credit institutions. As the so-called “grey” 
credit market started to grow in a vigorous fashion, the competitive pressures increased 
on the traditional banking sector. 
As a result of these pressures, a slow strategy of deregulation was started during 
the late 1970s. The most important factor that furthered this process was the escalating 
budget deficits. With liquidity ratios around 50%, there was a limit to how the commer-
cial banks could be used. 
Instead, a new kind of market-conforming Government Bonds (Statsskuldväxlar) 
were introduced in 1982, in order to tap into the new and freer markets. By the early part 
of the 1980s, the combination of a large state debt and an unusual number of mul-
tinational industrial companies made way for a situation where increasingly liberal 
solutions appeared at a surprisingly quick pace. As the Swedish professor in Economics 
                                                 
42 See for example A. Roos, ‘Bankmarknadens förändring’, Ekonomisk revy, No. 8 (1980). 
43 See for example: Jonung, ‘Riksbankens politik 1945-1990’, pp. 331-32; and Larsson, Staten och 
kapitalet, pp. 205-6. See especially Note 1, Ch. 5. After 1982, liquidity quotas (which included 
government bonds) were raised to 55%. This implied that banks held huge quantities of 
government bonds. In turn, this meant that the banks were very well capitalized in 1985. At that 
point in time, the huge quantity of government bonds could serve as the starting point for the 
infamous Swedish credit expansion of the late 1980s. 
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Johan Lübeck puts it: “In contrast to many other countries, Sweden was dependent upon 
professional financial institutions and operators...”.44 
The final result of the change over was remarkable. A closely controlled policy 
aimed at credit repression had dominated the institutional landscape for more than three 
decades. During the early 1980s, all of this was replaced with a largely unfettered credit 
market in less than half a decade. In many ways, the results of this were traumatic. 
Concluding remarks 
Having analysed and depicted the Swedish regulated structure for allocations of credits as 
a historically deeply embedded institution, how, then, could change be possible? Which 
were the economic structural factors and incentives that eventually led the Swedish 
governments to deregulate the foreign exchange market, hence laying the ground for a 
new structure for allocation of credits? First of all, structures for allocation of credits are 
crucial for the functioning of all economic systems and governments are supposedly 
anxious for attaining continued growth and prosperity not least by designing structural 
settings so as to offer favourable conditions for productive activities. From this the 
rapidly growing international capital market and the radically changing conditions for the 
big industrial enterprises (increased competition, decreased margins of profits, increased 
demands for investments, decreased productivity) all in all called forth a thorough 
restructuring of the institutional arrangements for allocation of credits in the Swedish 
economy. For the Swedish economy to be competitive and to be able to grow, the 
industrial sector had to have a full-fledged counterpart in the national commercial 
banking sector. In turn, to be competitive and to be able to offer favourable credit 
conditions, the banking sector had to have full access to the international capital market. 
All this could be summed up as an inevitable process of adjustment and institutional 
change, a process that was clearly anticipated by several commissions of inquiry set up 
by the Swedish Government in the 1960:s and 1970:s. 
As for both the timing and sequence, the late and hesitant Swedish deregulation of 
the foreign exchange market signifies the impact of historically embedded institutions. 
Not only had the Swedish regulation of foreign exchange existed for long time, serving 
its purpose in making it possible to institutionalise a genuinely nationally based structure 
                                                 
44 Cited from J. Lübeck, Den Finansiella sektorns utveckling i modern tid, SOU 2000: 11. See, as 
well, T. Svensson, Novemberrevolutionen. Om rationalitet och makt i beslutet att avreglera kredit-
marknaden 1985, (Stockholm, Fritzes, 1996) and I. Nygren, Från Stockholms Banco till Citibank, 
(Stockholm, Liber 1985). 
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for allocation of credits, but is also provided shelter from the credit markets of the 
surrounding world and was built upon an idea and a practice that the industrial companies 
should be both producers and financiers. Also, and indirectly, this institutional 
arrangement was closely bound up with the broader and general institutional arrangement 
of the Swedish political economy, an arrangement where the state, the large industrial 
companies and the labour unions were co-ordinated as a tripartite corporatist body. 
Accordingly, to deregulate the foreign exchange market did not only imply a shift 
of ideal for macroeconomic management (monetary regime). It did also amount to a shift 
as for the established institutional configuration and co-ordination of interests within the 
Swedish political economy. To deregulate the foreign exchange market and, conse-
quently, liberalise the structure for allocation of credits and venture capital, implied that 
the commercial banking sector (financier) and the industrial sector (producer) were re-
united as the two basic players within the field of growth and industrial change. This in 
turn meant that the role of the State became less significant as for the allocation of credits 
and venture capital. Consequently and indirectly, the labour movement as a whole lost 
influence upon the capitalistic market economy. In short, the relative power of diverging 
interest was indeed put at stake in the process of foreign exchange deregulation, thus 
rendering the decision-making process difficult for the Social Democratic Governments. 
